Supreme Court of the United States
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon
June 29, 1995515 U.S. 687
Summary
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's judgment invalidating the Interior Secretary's regulation defining 'harm' in the Endangered Species Act's 'take' prohibition to include significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife. Applying Chevron, the Court concluded that Congress did not unambiguously exclude habitat modification from 'take' and that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable in light of the ordinary meaning of 'harm,' the Act's broad conservation purpose, the legislative history, and the 1982 incidental-take-permit amendment; it also rejected the argument that the rule of lenity bars deference. Justice O'Connor concurred on the understanding that the regulation reaches only actual, foreseeably caused (proximate) death or injury to identifiable protected animals, viewing Palila II as wrongly decided; Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that 'take' is a term of art confined to affirmative acts directed at particular animals and that private-land habitat preservation was left to section 5 land acquisition.
Holding
- Whether the Secretary's regulation defining 'harm' to include significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife exceeds his authority under ESA section 9. No. The Secretary's definition of 'harm' rests on a permissible construction of the ESA: Congress did not unambiguously manifest an intent to adopt respondents' view excluding habitat modification from 'take,' and the Secretary's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference.
- Whether the rule of lenity bars deference to the Secretary's interpretation because the ESA authorizes criminal enforcement. No. The rule of lenity does not provide the standard for reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute authorizes criminal enforcement; the 'harm' regulation, in place for two decades and giving fair warning of its consequences, cannot be the kind of inadequate-notice interpretation at which lenity aims.
Docket 94-859
Cited authorities
- 16 U.S.C. § 1540(f)
- 16 U.S.C. §§ 1540
- 16 U.S.C. §§ 1540
- 87 Stat. 884
- 16 U.S.C. § 1531
- 16 U.S.C. § 1538
- 16 U.S.C. § 1532
- 50 C.F.R. § 17.3
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