Supreme Court of the United States

Suter v. Artist M.

March 25, 1992503 U.S. 347

Summary

The Supreme Court, reversing the Seventh Circuit, held that 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 neither confers a right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nor supports an implied private cause of action: read through the Pennhurst spending-power lens, the 'reasonable efforts' clause requires only that a State submit a plan containing that feature for the Secretary's approval, leaves its content largely to state discretion, and is policed by the Secretary through funding mechanisms rather than by private plaintiffs. Because no enforceable right exists, the Cort v. Ash inquiry into congressional intent likewise defeats a direct implied action. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented, contending that the Court abandoned the established three-part enforceability test and contradicted Wilder.

Holding

  • Whether § 671(a)(15) of the Adoption Act creates a right enforceable under § 1983. No. The 'reasonable efforts' language of § 671(a)(15) does not unambiguously confer an enforceable right on the Act's beneficiaries; the Act places on States only the requirement that they have a Secretary-approved plan containing the sixteen listed features, and the clause is at least as plausibly read as a rather generalized duty on the State, to be enforced by the Secretary rather than by private individuals.
  • Whether the Adoption Act contains an implied private right of action to enforce the reasonable-efforts clause. No. Under the familiar test of Cort v. Ash, the burden is on respondents to demonstrate that Congress intended to make a private remedy available, and Congress did not intend to create one; § 671(a)(15) creates no implied cause of action on the beneficiaries' behalf.

Docket 90-1488

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