Supreme Court of the United States

Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools

February 26, 1992503 U.S. 60

Summary

Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, held that monetary damages are available under Title IX's implied private right of action for intentional discrimination. The Court applied the presumption that all appropriate remedies are available for an actionable violation of federal law absent clear congressional direction otherwise, finding no restriction in Title IX or its subsequent amendments. Neither separation-of-powers principles nor Title IX's possible Spending Clause foundation barred damages for the intentional discrimination alleged. The Court reversed and remanded. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment. He rejected the majority's broad remedial presumption for judicially implied causes of action but concluded that the 1986 amendments implicitly acknowledged the availability of damages under Title IX.

Holding

  • Availability of monetary damages under Title IX's implied private right of action.. Monetary damages are available in a private action enforcing Title IX for intentional discrimination.
  • Separation-of-powers and Spending Clause objections to damages.. Neither separation-of-powers principles nor a Spending Clause basis for Title IX bars monetary damages for the intentional discrimination alleged.
  • Restriction of Title IX remedies to backpay and prospective relief.. The available remedies cannot be categorically restricted to backpay and prospective equitable relief.

Docket 90-918

Cited authorities

  • 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
  • CA11
  • 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
  • 27 Stat. 531
  • 42 U.S.C. § 1983
  • 100 Stat. 1845
  • Pub. L. 100-259, 102
  • 48 Colum. L. Rev. 1090

Cited by