Supreme Court of the United States, 1972

The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Powell, held that an affirmance by an equally divided Court does not constitute an actual adjudication that bars subsequent habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C.

The Supreme Court held that requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries does not abridge the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment, declining to create a constitutional reporter's privilege and leaving newsmen subject to the citizen's ordinary duty to answer…

The Court held that a Member of Congress’s Speech or Debate Clause protection extends to an aide only for conduct that would be protected legislative activity if performed by the Member, and that the Clause does not protect the Senator’s private arrangement to publish the Pentagon Papers.

Justice Stewart wrote for a majority that the lack of a contractual or tenure right does not defeat a public employee's First Amendment claim and affirmed the Court of Appeals' remand.

The Supreme Court reversed a three-judge District Court judgment that had declared §§ 212(a)(28)(D) and (G)(v) and § 212(d)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act unconstitutional as applied to bar Belgian Marxist scholar Ernest Mandel from entering the country to lecture.

The Court held that a nontenured public university professor whose fixed-term appointment expired had no procedural due process right to receive reasons or a hearing when the university declined to rehire him.

The Supreme Court held that a state college's denial of official recognition to a proposed SDS chapter burdened the students' First Amendment associational rights — cutting off use of campus meeting facilities, bulletin boards, and the student newspaper — and was not merely the withholding of a 'stamp of approval'…

The Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin convictions of the underground newspaper publisher, holding that both the article with photographs and the poem were protected by the First Amendment. The Court applied the Roth obscenity test and found the dominant theme was not prurient.

Justice Burger, dissenting, argues that the illegal exclusion of Negroes from juries does not automatically invalidate a conviction absent a showing of actual prejudice, and therefore the conviction should be upheld. He contends that the statutory prohibition in 18 U.S.C.

Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, concurs in the Court’s judgment, endorsing the view that the statutory prohibition against racial exclusion from juries supports allowing the petitioner to challenge his conviction, while noting limits on the scope of that protection.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s judgment that Willie Mae Barker was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Court rejected the rigid demand‑waiver rule and a fixed‑time standard, adopting a balancing test that weighs length of delay, reason for delay, the defendant’s assertion of the…

The Court held that Tampa municipal-court clerks may constitutionally issue arrest warrants for violations of municipal ordinances. The Fourth Amendment requires an issuing magistrate to be neutral and detached and capable of determining probable cause, but it does not require the magistrate to be a lawyer or judge…

The Supreme Court held that forum-selection clauses in international commercial (admiralty) contracts are prima facie valid and must be specifically enforced unless the party resisting enforcement clearly shows that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, that the clause is invalid for fraud or overreaching, or…

The Supreme Court held that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense—whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony—unless represented by counsel at trial, reversing the Florida Supreme Court's four-to-three decision limiting appointed counsel to offenses punishable by…

The Court held that Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin procedures violated the Fourteenth Amendment because they allowed state-authorized seizure of property without notice or an opportunity for a prior hearing.

The Court held that Pennsylvania's issuance of a liquor license to, and pervasive but racially neutral regulation of, Moose Lodge No. 107 did not make the club's racially discriminatory refusal to serve a Black guest 'state action' under the Equal Protection Clause, because where the impetus for discrimination is…

The Supreme Court held that Indiana could not constitutionally commit Theon Jackson, a mentally defective deaf mute with the mental level of a pre-school child, for an indefinite period solely because he was incompetent to stand trial on two minor robbery charges.

An opinion by Justice Stewart announcing the judgment of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, held that the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule does not extend to identification testimony based on a police-station showup conducted before the defendant had been indicted or…

Justice Blackmun concurs with the Court’s judgment that convictions based on less‑than‑unanimous jury verdicts do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. He adds that while he finds the split‑verdict system unwise, it is not constitutionally offensive, and therefore the Court should not strike it…

The Supreme Court held that the Government may compel testimony from a witness invoking the Fifth Amendment by granting immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 from use of the compelled testimony and from use of evidence derived directly or indirectly from it; such 'use and derivative-use' immunity is coextensive with the…

Justice Marshall, dissenting, argues that the Court’s decision erodes two core safeguards—jury unanimity and proof beyond a reasonable doubt—by allowing non‑unanimous verdicts and treating minority juror doubts as irrelevant, thereby weakening the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a fair trial.

Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented from approval of Louisiana's nonunanimous criminal jury verdict system. He reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require unanimity whenever a State provides trial by jury because unanimity is necessary to…

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from affirmance of convictions obtained by nonunanimous state-jury verdicts. He maintained that the Sixth Amendment jury-trial guarantee applies against state and federal governments under identical standards and that unanimity is necessary to ensure meaningful…

Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissents from the Court’s affirmation that non‑unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials satisfy the Sixth Amendment and Due Process requirements.

Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that New Jersey's grant of use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege and therefore sufficient to compel testimony, that the statute's "responsive" limitation is not unconstitutionally vague, and that a speculative fear…

The Court affirmed Johnson's armed-robbery conviction, returned by a nine-to-three jury verdict under Louisiana's nonunanimous-verdict provisions, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require jury unanimity in state criminal trials and that the dissent of three jurors does not…

Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Powell, held that the Sixth Amendment does not require unanimity of jury verdicts in state criminal trials and affirmed the Oregon Court of Appeals' judgment.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's reversal of the convictions of three Amish parents under Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law, holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling these respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to…

The Supreme Court resolved two consolidated cases arising from the 1954 Ute Partition Act's termination of federal supervision over mixed-blood members of the Uintah and Ouray Ute tribe.

The Court held that Louisiana violated equal protection by giving dependent unacknowledged illegitimate children a lower priority than dependent legitimate children in recovering workers’ compensation benefits for their father’s death.

The Supreme Court held that, absent fraud or bad faith, the Atomic Energy Commission's decision under the contract disputes clause is final and conclusive, and the United States cannot seek judicial review of that decision. The Court reversed the Court of Claims judgment.

The Supreme Court held that, absent fraud or bad faith, the Atomic Energy Commission’s decision under the contract disputes clause is final and conclusive and the United States may not seek judicial review of that decision; the Court reversed the Court of Claims.

Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Stewart and Justice Powell, concurs with the majority, agreeing that the Wunderlich Act does not permit the United States to challenge a factual finding of its own contracting agency under a disputes clause when no fraud or bad faith is alleged.

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dissents from the Court’s holding that the United States may not invoke the Wunderlich Act’s expanded grounds of judicial review to challenge a disputes‑clause decision favorable to a contractor; he would affirm the Court of Claims judgment.

Justice Brennan dissents, arguing that the Wunderlich Act was intended to give both contractors and the Government equal judicial review of disputes‑clause decisions and that the majority’s limitation of review to contractors is contrary to the statute’s language and legislative history.

The Supreme Court held that the Sierra Club lacked standing under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge federal approval of the Walt Disney Mineral King ski resort, because the 'injury in fact' test requires the party seeking review to be himself among the injured and the Club nowhere alleged that it…

The Supreme Court held that the federal district court had subject‑matter jurisdiction over the parties at the time it entered judgment, so the validity of the removal could not be raised for the first time on appeal; the judgment was therefore affirmed and the case remanded for further consideration on the merits.

The Supreme Court affirmed a three-judge District Court's judgment holding that Tennessee's one-year statewide and three-month countywide durational residence requirements for voting violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court held that the Government violated due process by failing to disclose an agreement promising its key witness that he would not be prosecuted in exchange for cooperation and testimony.