Supreme Court of the United States
Remmer v. United States
347 U.S. 227 · 74 S. Ct. 450 · 98 L. Ed. 654
Decided March 8, 1954
Good LawNo later Supreme Court decision is reported as reversing, vacating, or rejecting Remmer’s holding. Later courts continue to follow and apply its rule concerning improper juror contacts and presumptive prejudice, with additional courts explaining its application. The reported record therefore supports Remmer remaining good law.
Summary
The Court held that unauthorized private communications with a juror concerning a pending criminal case are presumptively prejudicial, with the Government bearing a heavy burden to establish harmlessness after notice to and a hearing involving the defendant. The trial court improperly resolved the reported contact and resulting FBI investigation ex parte. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded to the District Court for a hearing, directing a new trial if the incident proved harmful. The Court did not reach the petitioner's other claims. There were no separate opinions; Chief Justice Warren did not participate.
Holdings
- Presumption and burden arising from unauthorized juror contact.. Unauthorized private communications, contacts, or tampering with a juror concerning the pending criminal case are presumptively prejudicial, and the Government bears a heavy burden to establish harmlessness after notice to and a hearing involving the defendant. 347 U.S. 229
- Required procedure for investigating the reported juror contact.. The trial court must conduct a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate to determine the circumstances, impact, and prejudicial effect of the incident, and must grant a new trial if it finds harm to the petitioner. 347 U.S. 229–230
Written by LawDiver's case analysis.
How later courts treated this case
1,443 opinions cite this case
Limited
State of Iowa, Appellee v. Lee Samuel Christensen, Appellant., 929 N.W.2d 646. Remmer may have some remaining vitality under federal and state law, but we do not think it applies to the facts of this case.
Limited
Ernesto Roberto Ramirez, Appellant (defendant) v. State of Indiana, Appellee (plaintiff), 2014 Ind. LEXIS 344. The court recognized that the scope of the presumption has narrowed considerably since the original formulation.
Limited
United States of America, Appellee v. Kevin Williams-Davis, Appellants, 90 F.3d 490. The court held that the presumption had eroded and required a specific likelihood-of-prejudice inquiry.
Questioned
State v. Dixon. The court found no authority interpreting that requirement to mandate the defendant's personal presence.
Questioned
State of Maine v. Garrett Cheney, 2012 Me. LEXIS 119. The continuing validity of the presumption of prejudice standard has been subject to question.
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In this case
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted by a jury on several counts charging willful evasion of the payment of federal income taxes. A matter admitted by the Government to have been handled by the trial court in a manner that may have been prejudicial to the petitioner, and therefore confessed as error, is presented at the threshold and must be disposed of first.
After the jury had returned its verdict, the petitioner learned for the first time that during the trial a person unnamed had communicated with a certain juror, who afterwards became the jury foreman, and remarked to him that he could profit by bringing in a verdict favorable to the petitioner. The juror reported the incident to the judge, who informed the prosecuting attorneys and advised with them. As a result, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was requested to make an investigation and report, which was accordingly done. The F. B. I. report was considered by the judge and prosecutors alone, and they apparently concluded that the statement to the juror was made in jest, and nothing further was done or said about the matter. Neither the judge nor the prosecutors informed the petitioner of the incident, and he and his counsel first learned of the matter by reading of it in the newspapers after the verdict.
The above-stated facts were alleged in a motion for a new trial, together with an allegation that the petitioner was substantially prejudiced, thereby depriving him of a fair trial, and a request for a hearing to determine the circumstances surrounding the incident and its effect on the jury. * A supporting affidavit of the petitioner’s *229 attorneys recited the alleged occurrences and stated that if they had known of the incident they would have moved for a mistrial and requested that the juror in question be replaced by an alternate juror. Two newspaper articles reporting the incident were attached to the affidavit. The Government did not file answering affidavits. The District Court, without holding the requested hearing, denied the motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had not abused its discretion, since the petitioner had shown no prejudice to him. 205 F. 2d 277, 291. The case is here on writ of certiorari. 346 U. S. 884.
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140, 148-150; Wheaton v. United States, 133 F. 2d 522, 527.
We do not know from this record, nor does the petitioner know, what actually transpired, or whether the incidents that may have occurred were harmful or harmless. The sending of an F. B. I. agent in the midst of a trial to investigate a juror as to his conduct is bound to impress the juror and is very apt to do so unduly. A juror must feel free to exercise his functions without the F. B. I. or anyone else looking over his shoulder. The integrity of jury proceedings must not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions. The trial court should not decide and take final action ex parte on information such *230 as was received in this case, but should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.
We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court with directions to hold a hearing to determine whether the incident complained of was harmful to the petitioner, and if after hearing it is found to have been harmful, to grant a new trial.
Judgment vacated.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration . or decision of this case.
The motion for a new trial was also grounded on many other contentions, several of which have also been presented to this Court. Because of our disposition of the case on the issue treated herein, we do not pass upon these additional questions.
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