U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass'n

Maria E. Pintos, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Pacific Creditors Association; Experian Information Solutions, Inc…

605 F.3d 665

Decided May 21, 2010

Weak negativeNegative signal below the questioned threshold: 1 citing case carry negative treatment that is neither a binding overruling nor enough doubt to mark the case questioned.

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SummaryHoldingsLater treatmentOpinion of the Court

Summary

The court held that the Fair Credit Reporting Act did not authorize a collection agency to obtain Pintos’s credit report to collect an unadjudicated towing deficiency because she did not initiate the transaction and the agency was not a judgment creditor. It also held that a reporting agency’s general subscriber certification did not, by itself, discharge the agency’s independent verification obligations, and that documents attached to a dispositive motion could be sealed only on a showing of compelling reasons supported by findings. The court reversed the summary judgment, vacated the order denying Experian’s sealing motion, and remanded both matters for further proceedings.

Holdings

  • Whether § 1681b(a)(3)(A) authorized PCA to obtain Pintos’s credit report to collect the towing deficiency.. No. Section 1681b(a)(3)(A) did not authorize PCA to obtain Pintos’s report because the deficiency claim arose from a transaction Pintos did not initiate, and PCA was not collecting a judgment debt. 675-676
  • Whether PCA’s blanket certification relieved Experian of its independent duties under § 1681e(a).. No. A subscriber’s blanket certification alone does not absolve a credit reporting agency of its independent obligation to make a reasonable effort to verify the certification and determine whether reasonable grounds exist to suspect impermissible use. The certification therefore did not eliminate all genuine issues of material fact concerning Experian’s liability. 677
  • What standard governed Experian’s motion to seal documents attached to Pintos’s dispositive motion, and whether the district court’s ruling could stand.. The compelling-reasons standard governed because the documents were attached to a dispositive motion and were judicial records. The unexplained denial could not stand; the sealing issue was vacated and remanded for findings under the proper standard. 678-679

Written by LawDiver's case analysis.

How later courts treated this case

1,697 opinions cite this case

  • Questioned

    Jenipher Owuor, Charles Owuor v. SunnyMac, LLC, JK Renewables, LLC, Matthew MacFadden, Sunstrong Capital Holdings, LLC. The court was bound by the controlling circuit interpretation of the same statutory language in a materially similar solar-financing dispute.

  • Explained

    Ptc Therapeutics, Inc. v. Acurex Biosciences Corporation. “good cause” is also the proper standard when a party seeks access to previously sealed discovery attached to a nondispositive motion.

  • Cited

    Megan Trama v. UniCourt Inc.. cited for the standard on sealing confidentiality

  • Cited

    Kameron Compton v. Sony Entertainment Interactive LLC, Epic Games, Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Mojang Studios. citing Pintos for supporting sealing when compelling interest outweighs public interest

  • Cited

    SolarPark Korea Co., Ltd. v. Solaria Corporation. The opinion states that the standard derives from the common-law right to inspect and copy public records and documents.

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In this case

Opinion of the Court

Dissent to Order by

Chief Judge KOZINSKI;

Dissent to Order by Judge GOULD; Opinion by Judge CLIFTON; Dissent by Judge BEA.

ORDER

This court’s opinion, filed April 30, 2009, is amended by adding additional language to footnote 2 (565 F.3d at 1114). The existing text in footnote 2 will become the first paragraph of the footnote and the new language follows, such that the entire footnote reads:

In this appeal of a summary judgment, PCA and Experian argued only that § 1681b(a)(3)(A) authorized PCA to obtain Pintos’s credit report. Thus, we need not determine whether PCA had a permissible purpose under any other § 1681b subsection. On remand, Defendants may argue that PCA was authorized to obtain Pintos’s report under a different subsection.
In the briefs on the merits, oral argument, petitions for rehearing, and response to petitions for rehearing, there was no argument based on 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(m) and 1681b(c). The parties did not appear to view those provisions to be relevant to this case. During our court’s consideration of the petitions for rehearing en banc, it was suggested that these provisions, though drafted at a different time and aimed at a different situation, might shed light on the meaning of the relevant statute, § 1681b(a)(3)(A), so we requested supplemental briefs on that subject. The supplemental briefs have not persuaded us to change our opinion.
Those other provisions, §§ 1681a(m) and 1681b(c), were added in 1996 to permit lenders and insurance companies to solicit for business by purchasing lists and limited information about customers who match certain criteria (such as zip code and credit score) from credit reporting agencies. The “prescreened” customers could then be sent, for example, a “preapproved” credit card solicitation. Pintos did not authorize the reporting agency to supply her report and the transaction did not consist of “a firm offer of credit or insurance,” under § 1681b(c). Nobody contends otherwise.
At the same time, it should be clear that we do not opine on the meaning or scope of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(m) and 1681b(c) or on the practice of obtaining information from credit reporting agencies to permit the extension of offers to prescreened customers, which the parties to our case agree is authorized by those statutes. A case presenting those questions is not before us.

A judge of the court called for a vote on the petitions for rehearing en banc. A vote was taken, and a majority of the active judges of the court failed to vote for en banc rehearing. Fed. R.App. P. 35.

The petitions for rehearing en banc are DENIED. No further petitions for rehearing may be filed.

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