U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

United States v. William F. McQuade and Wilma N. McQuade

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. William F. McQuade and Wilma N. McQuade, Defendants-Appellants

647 F.2d 938

Decided June 8, 1981

Good LawGood law: 92 citing cases carry treatments with no negative treatment.

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SummaryHoldingsLater treatmentOpinion of the Court

Summary

In a per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the McQuades' motion for court-appointed counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which they refused to support with a financial statement. The court held there is no absolute constitutional right to appointed counsel — the right arises from an indigent's need for fair equality with those who can afford counsel — and that the Fourth Amendment does not shield financial disclosures demanded for a lawful purpose. It further held that § 1915 motions rest in the trial court's sound discretion, are granted only in exceptional circumstances, and require poverty affidavits stating facts with particularity, and it dismissed the vagueness challenge to the statute's 'poverty' requirement as patently frivolous.

Holdings

  • Whether the Constitution guarantees an absolute right to court-appointed counsel regardless of financial position.. No. The constitutional right to a state-financed defense arises only because of the indigent's need for reasonably fair equality with those who have adequate financial means to protect their rights; a person who can afford to retain counsel has no constitutional right to have counsel appointed. 940
  • Whether the Fourth Amendment shields a section 1915(d) movant from compelled disclosure of financial status.. No. The fourth amendment does not protect an individual from complying with a demand for information for a lawful purpose merely because his responses might prove embarrassing or result in an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs. 940
  • Whether the district court erred in denying the section 1915(d) motion absent a financial statement verifying poverty.. No. Motions for appointment of counsel under section 1915 are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and are granted only in exceptional circumstances; poverty affidavits must state the facts of affiant's poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty, and the court acted within its discretion in making a factual inquiry and denying the motion when the appellants were unable, or unwilling, to verify their poverty. 940
  • Whether the 'poverty' requirement of section 1915 is unconstitutionally vague.. No. The contention that the movants must be provided counsel because the 'poverty' requirement of section 1915 is unconstitutionally vague is patently frivolous. 940

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How later courts treated this case

925 opinions cite this case

  • Cited

    Michael James Taylor v. Jason Besaw. The opinion uses McQuade to support the need for specificity in the affidavit.

  • Cited

    Ula Enriquez v. County of San Joaquin Registrar of Voters. citing McQuade for the requirement that an IFP affidavit contain particularized facts of poverty

  • Cited

    Carmen Martinez v. Canyon County Jail Medical Staff, Canyon County Sheriff’s Office. Cited for the affidavit requirement under 28 U.S.C. §1915.

  • Cited

    Nelson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company. court cites McQuade for the need for particularity in affidavit

  • Cited

    Anthony A. Adams v. Tesla General Insurance, Inc;. The opinion cites McQuade to require particularity in the poverty affidavit.

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In this case

Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM:

The McQuades appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for court-appointed counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The district court denied their motion because they would not “submit an affidavit as to their present financial standing .... ” Ap-pellees assert the district court twice told appellants the court could not make a determination of indigency without a financial statement; appellants then filed an affidavit stating they were unable to pay for their defense, but not stating the factual basis for this claim; and appellants thereafter told the court they would not file a financial statement. The appellants do not dispute these facts. Instead they claim they have an absolute constitutional right to court-appointed counsel, regardless of their financial position, and that they are protected from disclosing their financial status by the “Fourth Amendment right to privacy.”

*940 These arguments are without merit. The constitutional right to a state financed defense arises because of “the crucial right of an indigent to reasonably fair equality with those who have adequate financial means to protect their rights,” United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1975). A person who can afford to retain counsel has no constitutional right to have counsel appointed. Nor does the fourth amendment protect an individual from complying with a demand for information for a lawful purpose merely because “his responses might prove embarrassing or result in an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353, 94 S.Ct. 613, 622, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); see also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195, 66 S.Ct. 494, 498, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946); Paine v. McCarthy, 527 F.2d 173, 177 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Theep, 502 F.2d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1971).

Motions for appointment of counsel under section 1915 are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and are granted only in exceptional circumstances. United States v. McQuade, 579 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1978). When a claim of poverty is made under section 1915 “it is proper and indeed essential for the supporting affidavits to state the facts as to affiant’s poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960). It was within the court’s discretion to make a factual inquiry, see In re Stump, 449 F.2d 1297, 1298 (1st Cir. 1971); Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505 (10th Cir. 1969); and to deny the motion when the appellants were unable, or unwilling, to verify their poverty. Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d at 725; cf. United States v. Kaufman, 452 F.2d 1202, 1202 (4th Cir. 1971) (criminal defendant denied court-appointed counsel for failure to demonstrate indigency); United States v. White, 344 F.2d 92, 93 (4th Cir. 1965) (same); Smartt v. Bomar, 340 F.2d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1965) (same).

Finally, the appellants’ contention that they must be provided counsel because the “poverty” requirement of section 1915 is unconstitutionally vague is patently frivolous.

AFFIRMED.

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