Seizures, Torres v. Madrid, and Hot Pursuit After Lange

Fourth Amendment litigation often begins with a threshold question: was there a search or a seizure at all? Two recent Supreme Court decisions sharpen different edges of that inquiry. Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021) defines when physical force amounts to a seizure. Lange v. California, 592 U.S. ___ (2021) rejects a categorical rule that hot pursuit of a misdemeanant always justifies warrantless entry into a home.

This guide is educational background, not legal advice.

Torres v. Madrid: force with intent to restrain

In Torres, officers shot a woman as she drove away from an encounter; she continued fleeing and was not immediately stopped. The Court held that the application of physical force to the body with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in stopping the person.

“The application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued.” — Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021)

Torres separates the existence of a seizure from later questions about reasonableness or qualified immunity. Getting shot can be a seizure even when the person escapes—an important clarification for use-of-force timelines and evidence collected after the shooting.

Show-of-authority seizures still matter

Torres addresses force. Classic show-of-authority seizures—where officers display authority and a person submits—remain governed by earlier cases. Practitioners must identify which seizure theory fits the facts: force, submission to authority, or both in sequence.

Lange v. California: hot pursuit is not categorical for misdemeanors

Lange involved an officer pursuing a driver suspected of misdemeanor offenses into a garage attached to a home. The Court held that pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant does not categorically justify a warrantless home entry. Instead, courts must evaluate whether exigent circumstances exist on the particular facts—flight, danger, destruction of evidence, and similar considerations.

“The flight of a suspected misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home.” — Lange v. California, 592 U.S. ___ (2021)

That case-by-case approach preserves hot pursuit as a real exigency in many scenarios while refusing an automatic home-entry rule for every fleeing minor offender.

How Lange interacts with emergency-aid doctrine

Home-entry exceptions overlap. Emergency aid under Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) and Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009) focuses on immediate need to protect life or prevent violence. Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021) rejects a freestanding community-caretaking entry into the home. Lange adds that “he ran from a misdemeanor stop” is not enough, standing alone, to unlock the door.

Case v. Montana (2026) is a recent Supreme Court decision in the emergency-aid conversation; consult the opinion itself for how it refines welfare-entry analysis alongside Brigham City and Caniglia.

Seizures, devices, and follow-on searches

Once a person or effect is seized, separate rules govern searches of digital devices and location data. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) generally requires a warrant for phone-content searches incident to arrest. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) addresses historical CSLI. A lawful or disputed seizure of a person does not automatically authorize every downstream data search.

Analytical sequence for researchers

1. Identify any seizure. Force under Torres? Submission to authority? Temporary detention?
2. Assess reasonableness separately. Existence of a seizure is not liability.
3. If officers entered a home, name the exception. Hot pursuit (fact-specific after Lange), emergency aid, consent, warrant, or another recognized ground—not a slogan.
4. Separate entry from evidence search. Seeing an item in plain view differs from opening a phone.
5. Track state constitutional analogues. Some states impose stricter home-entry rules.

Why these cases travel together

Street encounters frequently combine force, flight, and threshold crossings in seconds. Torres tells courts when the Fourth Amendment clock starts on force. Lange tells courts not to treat every chase as a constitutional skeleton key to the home. Read together with emergency-aid precedents, they form a modern toolkit for evaluating rapidly unfolding police entries and uses of force.

Frequently asked questions

If someone escapes after being shot, was there still a seizure?

Under Torres, application of physical force with intent to restrain can be a seizure even if the person is not subdued. Later reasonableness and immunity questions remain distinct.

Does Lange abolish hot pursuit entries?

No. Lange rejects a categorical misdemeanor hot-pursuit rule for home entry. Fact-specific exigency—including pursuit in many felony and dangerous situations—can still justify warrantless entry.

Does this article assess whether a particular chase entry was lawful?

No. That determination depends on the suspected offense, the facts of flight and danger, and controlling precedent. This guide explains Supreme Court doctrine for research purposes only.