In the Matter of the Detention of Thomas LaBelle. in the Matter of the Detention of Maurice Marshall. in the Matter…

Summary

Deciding four consolidated but technically moot involuntary-commitment appeals because they raise issues of first impression of continuing and substantial public interest, the Washington Supreme Court held that the 'gravely disabled' criteria of RCW 71.05.020(1) are neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad once properly construed: subsection (a) requires a substantial risk of serious physical harm from failure to provide essential needs, evidenced by recent tangible proof and causally connected to mental disorder, while subsection (b) requires recent significant loss of cognitive or volitional control, care that is essential rather than merely beneficial, and an inability to make a rational treatment decision. Applying a substantial-evidence review under the 'highly probable' test, the court affirmed the 90-day commitments of LaBelle and Marshall and Trueblood's 14-day commitment, but vacated Richardson's 90-day commitment and Trueblood's 180-day less restrictive treatment order for insufficient evidence. It declared the standardized written findings inadequate and imposed a more specific findings requirement prospectively, upheld the preponderance standard at 14-day probable cause hearings under a Mathews-type balancing, and sustained the compelled waiver of the physician-patient privilege at Trueblood's 180-day hearing.