Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for a new punishment hearing, holding that the State failed to prove the victim “engaged” in sexual conduct, so the conviction for sexual performance of a child was unsupported, but the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for the…

The Court granted habeas relief on the applicants’ false‑testimony and Brady claims, set aside their convictions and ordered new trials, while denying relief on actual‑innocence and ineffective‑assistance claims.

The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, holding that even if pronouncing a sentence via videoconference violated Article 42.03’s presence requirement, the error was harmless, and that the appellate court retained jurisdiction despite the alleged error and a defective notice of…

The Court granted the applicant’s post‑conviction writ of habeas corpus, finding that trial counsel’s erroneous advice regarding parole rendered the guilty pleas involuntary. Relying on Ex parte Moussazadeh, the Court held the applicant met his burden of showing counsel’s deficient performance and prejudice.

The Court granted the applicant’s habeas corpus relief, setting aside the district court’s judgment and remanding the case for the applicant to answer the indictment. The decision relied on Ex parte Mable and held that the plea was involuntary, despite dissenting opinions contesting the finding of confinement and the…

The Court granted the applicant’s writ of habeas corpus, finding that his sentence was illegal because a habitual enhancement was based on a state jail felony that is not permissible. Accordingly, the prior sentence was set aside and the case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

The Court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to withdraw its abatement order and reinstate the appeal, finding the appellate court lacked authority to abate because no qualifying error under Rule 44.4(a) existed and the relator had no adequate remedy at law.

The Court granted the applicant's writ of habeas corpus, finding ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland and setting aside the 16‑year sentence, remanding for a new punishment hearing; Justice Yeary, dissenting, argued that laches bars relief.

The Court held that the court of appeals properly considered Appellant’s preserved but unassigned indictment-notice claim on remand, because the prior remand did not resolve that distinct claim and the court of appeals retained broad authority to address remaining issues.

The court denied habeas relief on all seven claims arising from Applicant's capital-murder conviction and death sentence. It held Claim 1 procedurally barred, rejected the guilt-phase investigation and other ineffective-assistance claims on the merits, and concluded that any deficiency in the mitigation investigation…

The court affirmed the capital-murder conviction and death sentence, rejecting challenges concerning jury selection, the defendant's absence from pretrial status hearings, excluded testimony, lesser-included-offense instructions, penalty-phase evidence, jury deliberations, a mistrial, mitigation instructions, and a…

The Court held that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does not apply to a hearing on a motion to enter adjudication of guilt and revoke deferred-adjudication community supervision.

The Court affirmed that the Thirteenth Court of Appeals never lost jurisdiction over the State’s appeal despite an assistant district attorney signing an amended notice, and therefore correctly denied the appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the Fourth Court of Appeals and remanded for it to address the State’s consensual‑encounter argument, holding that the State need not raise all independent arguments to defeat a trial court’s suppression ruling.

The court vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded because the record did not establish that Smith had meaningful access to the appellate record before the court resolved the Anders brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw.

The court held that McDonald’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel ended when the grand jury no-billed and the State dismissed the charges in 2008; a later re-investigation and re-filing did not revive that earlier right.

The court affirmed Lewis’s capital-murder conviction and death sentence, concluding that the evidence supported both the guilt verdict and the jury’s future-dangerousness finding.

The Court held that the statutory “presence or view” condition for certain warrantless arrests requires perception of an offense through an officer’s senses; post-incident investigation establishing probable cause that a completed offense occurred does not satisfy that condition.

The court granted relief on Jordan’s claim that the punishment-phase instructions did not allow the jury to give meaningful effect to his mental and neurological mitigation evidence, finding the error harmful and vacating his death sentence for a new punishment trial.

The Court held that the erroneous inclusion of the self-defense presumption-of-reasonableness instruction caused at least some harm because the prosecutor repeatedly used it to tell the jury that criminal activity barred self-defense altogether, and the trial judge’s rulings reinforced that misstatement.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed William George Davis’s capital murder conviction and death sentence. It held that the trial court’s jury charge satisfied the unanimity requirement for a single capital murder offense despite multiple aggravating victims, and that the trial court did not err on issues of…

The Court held that subsection (f)(1) of Tex. Penal Code §22.021 is an element of the super‑aggravated sexual assault offense and therefore must be reflected in the judgment’s “Statute for Offense” box; it reversed the Court of Appeals, remanded the case, and ordered the trial court to amend the judgment accordingly.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed William Darin Irvan’s conviction and death sentence, holding that the convicting court properly limited testimony at the Article 64.04 hearing, correctly applied the reasonable‑probability standard to the post‑conviction DNA results, and rightly declined to order CODIS…

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, holding that preservation was not required for the error and that the jury‑charge error was correctly reviewed under the egregious‑harm standard; dissenting and concurring opinions argued differing views on the nature of subsection (e‑1) and…

Justice Finley dissents, arguing that the case is a Cronic‑type ineffective‑assistance claim because trial counsel abandoned his advocacy during the punishment phase, thereby destroying the adversarial nature of the trial.

The Court reversed the conviction for evading arrest, holding that no rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Garcia’s traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. It affirmed that the lawful‑arrest element of Tex.

The Court held that the First Court of Appeals lacked authority to abate the appeal and order the trial court to hear an untimely motion for new trial, and dismissed all other improvidently granted grounds of review, reversing and remanding the case.

The Court held that Texas cargo theft statute §31.18 is not materially different from the organized retail theft statute §31.16 and, like the latter, requires proof of an activity distinct from the theft itself, rendering the statute ambiguous.

The Court affirmed Taylor Parker’s capital murder conviction and death sentence, holding that the evidence supported the kidnapping aggravator, that the trial court properly denied a change of venue, and that the denial of a continuance and other evidentiary rulings were not reversible error.

The Court affirmed Robert Solis's capital murder conviction and death sentence, finding the evidence sufficient to support both the guilt finding and the jury's future‑dangerousness determination, and rejecting his attempts to withdraw his waiver of counsel and his challenges to evidentiary rulings.

The Court held that a drug‑detection dog’s nose entering a vehicle through an open window during an open‑air sniff is a physical intrusion that constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, and therefore the trial court’s suppression of the seized contraband was proper. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

The Court held that Article 42A.751(i) applies only when nonpayment is the sole alleged ground, so because the State alleged additional grounds the failure‑to‑pay statute did not impose a burden on the State and the trial court’s adjudication order was proper.

In a dissent, Judge Yeary argued that the Court should not grant post‑conviction habeas relief because the overbreadth doctrine was misapplied and relief should be limited to an as‑applied challenge.

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the appellate court’s judgment, holding that the prosecutor’s closing‑argument comment that the defendant was prejudiced against Hispanics was improper because no evidence supported a racial motive.

The Court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support Marian Fraser’s felony‑murder conviction, that the search warrants for her electronic devices lacked the required nexus and therefore should be suppressed, and that the trial court’s reliance on Texas Rule of Evidence 105 was erroneous.

The Court held that the dangerous-dog requirements in Section 822.042(a) impose a mandatory statutory duty that may satisfy the duty element for injury to a child by omission, and that the statute does not require the duty to be owed to the injured child specifically.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC) has exclusive jurisdiction over campaign‑law violations, making exhaustion of TEC administrative remedies a jurisdictional prerequisite before criminal prosecution.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the Fourth Court of Appeals, holding that the proper standard of review for the plain view doctrine is de novo and that Detective Jackson’s seizure of Appellee’s cell phone was authorized under the plain view doctrine.

Justice Finley, joined by Judge Parker, dissents from the majority’s grant of habeas relief on the applicant’s involuntary plea claim, arguing that the record contains sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of falsity of the officer’s testimony and that the applicant failed to meet the burden for a…

The Court held that a passenger detained during a traffic stop has standing to challenge a vehicle search that results from an allegedly unreasonably prolonged detention, reversed the appellate court’s decision and remanded for the appellate court to address the reasonableness of the detention.