Supreme Court of the United States
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banks
January 24, 2005543 U.S. 426
Summary
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion for a unanimous participating Court, holding that when a litigation recovery constitutes income, the plaintiff generally must include the portion paid to an attorney under a contingent-fee agreement. The anticipatory assignment doctrine applies because the plaintiff retains control over the cause of action and the attorney acts as the plaintiff’s agent, not a joint owner. State-law protections for an attorney’s fee do not change that result unless they alter the fundamental principal-agent relationship. The Court declined to decide the treatment of court-awarded statutory fees or alternative tax theories not considered below. It reversed both appellate judgments and remanded. There were no separate opinions; Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate.
Holding
- Inclusion of contingent attorney fees in a plaintiff’s gross income.. As a general rule, when a litigation recovery constitutes income, the plaintiff’s income includes the portion paid to the attorney as a contingent fee.
- Effect of state-law protections for an attorney’s contingent fee.. Contractual or state-law rights securing an attorney’s contingent fee do not exclude that fee from the plaintiff’s income so long as they do not alter the fundamental principal-agent character of the attorney-client relationship.
Docket 03-892
Cited authorities
- Rule 1.3
- Rule 1.7
- 26 U.S.C. § 704
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
- 26 U.S.C. §§ 67-68
- 118 Stat. 1418
- 26 U.S.C. § 1
- CA11